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We measure the degree of overconfidence in judgment (in the form of miscalibration, i.e., the 
tendency to overestimate the precision of one’s information) and self-monitoring (a form of 
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uncertainty about the asset value, are expected to be especially vulnerable to the winner’s curse. High 
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Judgmental overconfidence, self-monitoring and trading 





Allying techniques from experimental economics and experimental psychology, we relate 
market data to independent measures of the psychological characteristics of the actors 
involved. This enables us to test hypotheses about the consequences of psychological 
variables for market behaviour.  
 
Our experimental approach relies on an asymmetric information trading game directly 
inspired by Plott and Sunder (1988). The value of the asset can be high (490), medium (240), 
or low (50). The traders observe different private signals. For example when the value of the 
asset is high, half the participants are privately informed that it is not low, while the others 
learn privately that it not medium. Traders can place limit and market orders in a call auction 
and an open outcry continuous market. There is a strong winner’s curse risk in this trading 
game. For example, if an agent with a bullish signal (not 50) offered to buy, say at 270, this 
bid would systematically be hit by traders with bearish signals (not 490), while traders with 
neutral signals (not 240) would be much more reluctant to engage in trading. Biais and Pouget 
(1999) show that in equilibrium in this trading game there should be no trade, except at fully 
revealing prices, and consequently no trading gains or losses.  
 
While the experimental data suggests that a fair amount of information is revealed in the 
prices, we also observe significant deviations from equilibrium.  Very high prices signal 
unambiguously that the asset value is 490 and very low prices signal that the value is low. 
However, in the experiment, transaction prices close to 240 convey a more ambiguous signal. 
For such prices the proportion of cases in our experiments where the true asset is 240 is only 
52%. Consequently, in the 48% of cases where the price deviates from true value, some of the 
players must earn non-negligeable profits at the expense of others. In line with the 
behavioural game theory approach suggested by Camerer (1997), we study whether this 
phenomenon can be predicted by psychological factors. 
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A specific kind of overconfidence in one’s judgment, which we refer to as miscalibration, can 
offer an explanation for the failure of some participants to realize that their trades suffer from 
winner’s curse risk and are consequently loss making. Miscalibrated people tend to 
overestimate the precision of their information. We measure this bias using a confidence-
interval task (Alpert and Raiffa, 1982).1 In an experimental asset market, Kirchler and 
Macejovsky (in press) used a confidence-interval technique and found evidence of 
overconfidence in predictions of price variations. In a financial market context with 
asymmetric information, Benos (1998), Odean (1998) and Daniel, Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyam (1998) show theoretically that this form of overconfidence leads to poor 
performance. Our experimental approach is particularly well suited to test this conclusion, 
since we can rely on direct measures of psychological variables, as well as of trading 
performance. 
 
In these theoretical analyses, underperformance in the market will stem from overconfidence 
in the precision of one’s private signal. In the simple information structure of our game, 
participants cannot overestimate the precision of their private signal. Yet, we expect 
miscalibrated participants to overestimate the precision of their information set, which 
includes their signal as well as the observation of the market prices. When conditional 
uncertainty about the value of the asset is high, rational agents will recognize this. In contrast, 
miscalibrated traders will be less aware of this, and thus show excessive confidence in their 
assessment of the value of the asset. Hence, we expect them to be especially vulnerable to the 
winner’s curse. We identify market circumstances where this problem is likely to be 
particularly acute. As mentioned above, in our experimental data, when the opening price is 
close to 240, there is  actually almost one chance in two (48%) that the true value of the asset 
is 490 or 50. In this context, miscalibrated participants whose signal does not rule out that the 
value is 240, will overconfidently believe the asset is worth 240. Thus they will be prone to 
fall into a winner’s curse trap whereby they will incur losses through trading with other 
participants who make gains at their expense.2  
                                                 
1 Other kinds of overconfidence, such as a prevalent tendency to overestimate our skills, our prospects for 
success, or the probability of positive outcomes have also attracted a lot of attention from psychologists (see, 
e.g., Taylor and Brown, 1988). Miscalibration is conceptually distinguishable from “positive illusions” such as 
the belief that one is above average or the illusion of control. Indeed, a psychometric study by Regner et al. 
(2003) finds no correlation between miscalibration and such “positive illusions”.   
2 The winner’s curse traps we identify are not without similarities with the information traps analysed by 
Camerer, Noeth, Plott and Weber (1999). However our emphasis on (and measurement of) psychological 
  3
 
In addition to studying a cognitive bias such as miscalibration, in this paper we also study 
how social dispositions can affect market performance. Self-monitoring is a disposition to 
attend to social cues and to adjust one’s behaviour to one’s social environment (Snyder, 
1974). High self monitors are role players who habitually anticipate the effect of their 
behaviour on others, and in addition anticipate that the others will behave strategically. 
Anticipating that other market participants will be trying to manipulate the market as they 
themselves do, high self monitors will be less likely to take market prices at face value. 
Rather, they will reason about the signals and strategies that generated these prices. For 
example, when observing a price near to 240, they will not so readily jump to the conclusion 
that this indicates that the value is 240. Thus, they should be relatively unlikely to fall into 
winner’s curse traps and thus should avoid the corresponding trading losses. 
 
26 cohorts of students from Toulouse University and the London Business School participated 
in our experimental trading game. For 245 participants, we measured miscalibration using a 
scale adapted from Russo and Schoemaker (1992), and self-monitoring using the scale 
developed by Snyder and Gangestad (1986), and collected data about behaviour and 
performance in the experimental market.   
 
Our basic analysis focuses on the direct link between psychological characteristics of the 
participants and their trading profits. We find that miscalibration reduces trading performance 
in the experimental market, while self-monitoring enhances it. To gain further insights into 
the nature of the relation between psychological variables and market outcomes, we then 
analyse winner’s curse traps. To do so, we focus on situations where the market price is close 
to 240, while the value of the asset is in fact 50 or 490. We analyse the consequences of 
psychological characteristics for agents who are in such market circumstances, while their 
private signal does not rule out that the value is 240. We find that their profits are reduced by 
miscalibration and increased by self-monitoring. The impact of both psychological factors is 
significant. In contrast, for participants who were not exposed to winner’s curse traps, the 
psychological variables have no significant impact on profits. Our results therefore suggest 
that winner’s curse traps are the major channel of the impact of miscalibration and self-
monitoring in our experimental market. 
                                                                                                                                                        
characteristics differs from their study of the mutual consistency between mistaken beliefs. 
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Since we measure psychological characteristics independently of trading performance and 
gender, our experiment offers an opportunity to study the relationships between these 
variables. In line with Barber and Odean (2001) we find that men tend to trade more than 
women, but while they use gender as a proxy for overconfidence, we find no correlation 
between gender and miscalibration. When we split the data by gender, and run the analysis 
separately for men and women, we find different patterns of behaviour. While miscalibration 
does not significantly affect performance in women, it does lead to worse performance in 
men. This effect is significant and robust across samples.3  
 
While behavioural finance studies based on field data offer the clear advantage of 
documenting phenomena occurring in natural markets, the advantage of experimental 
approaches is to study controlled environments, allowing more confident inferences about 
cause and effect relations.4 To assess causal relations between independent variables (e.g. 
miscalibration, self-monitoring) and dependent variables (e.g. trading strategies, earnings) we 
use a quasi-experimental design (Cook and Campbell, 1979).  Rather than experimentally 
manipulating participants’ beliefs (as, e.g., Camerer and Lovallo, 1999), we measured pre-
existing variations in participants’ calibration of their judgment and self-monitoring several 
weeks before they participated in the trading game. Precautions were taken to ensure that 
participants would not associate the psychological measurements with the trading game. This 
quasi-experimental method licences inferences by the method of difference (Mill, 1872/1973), 
as all things being equal there should be no other factors than (say) high versus low 
miscalibration which distinguish these two groups when we contrast their earnings. This 
entitles us to attribute any significant variations in dependent variables (e.g. earnings) to the 
causal impact of the independent variables (e.g. miscalibration).  
 
The measures of miscalibration and self-monitoring on which we rely have been developed 
and used previously by experimental psychologists. Jenkins (1993) and Snyder and Gangestad 
(1986) have documented the internal psychometric validity of the self-monitoring scale. More 
                                                 
3 It is also robust to the inclusion of IQ in the regressors for a subsample where this variable was available. 
4 This argument is similar to the point made by Weber and Camerer (1998, p 168) about the consequences of 
another psychological phenomenon, namely the disposition effect : “a conclusive test of the disposition effect 
using real market data is usually difficult because the investors’ expectations, as well as the individual decisions 
cannot be controlled or easily observed in markets like the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). If an effect is 
found at the aggregate level there are often competing plausible hypotheses to explain it. In this paper we 
therefore present an experimental investigation of the disposition effect.” 
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recently, Klayman, Soll, Gonzales-Vallejo and Barlas (1999), Jonsson and Allwood (2003) 
and  Parker and Fischhoff (2001) offer evidence of stable individual differences in 
miscalibration. The experimental psychology literature also suggests that significant 
variations in miscalibration and self-monitoring exist in numerous populations outside our 
sample, ensuring the external validity of our independent variable. Note further that the 
questions we asked to the participants to measure miscalibration and self-monitoring had 
nothing to do with financial markets per se, yet they nevertheless affect strategies and 
performance in the experimental market. This points to the robustness of the psychological 
constructs independent of the context in which the questions are asked. Finally note that our 
sample includes students from the Masters in Finance and MBA of the London Business 
School as well as students from Toulouse University. While many of the former had previous 
professional experience in investment and financial markets, we find that the effect of 
psychological characteristics is robust across sub-samples.  
 
The next section presents the experimental trading game. Section 3 presents the psychological 
traits and our hypotheses. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 offers a brief conclusion 
summarising our results and sketches some avenues of further research.  
 
2) The experimental market 
 




The structure of the market, the asset payoffs, the endowments and the signals are as in 
Market 7, Series C, in Plott and Sunder (1988) except that in the present case short sales are 
allowed and there is a call auction in addition to the continuous market. As in Plott and 
Sunder (1988), there is a single risky asset, which pays a liquidating dividend at the end of the 
game which can be 490 francs, 240 francs or 50 francs with equal probability. Before trading 
starts the players receive heterogeneous private signals. When the dividend is 490 francs, half 
the players know that it is not 240 francs, while the other half know that it is not 50 francs. 
Similarly when the dividend is 240 francs, half the players know it is not 490 francs, while 
half the players know it is not 50 francs, and when the dividend is 50 francs, half the players 
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know it is not 490 francs, while half the players know it is not 240 francs. Each agent starts 
each replication of the game with 4 shares and 25000 francs (of experimental currency).  
 
As in financial markets in the field, players can place market or limit orders to buy or sell. We 
consider two treatments for the experimental market. In the first treatment, each replication of 
the trading game starts with an opening call auction, followed by a continuous market. In the 
call auction, the participants can transmit limit orders to the experimenter as sealed bids for up 
to ten shares at each price, written on a piece of paper. Using these orders,  the experimenter 
constructs an aggregate supply and an aggregate demand curve, and sets the opening price at 
the level maximising trading volume. This price is announced publicly to the participants. In 
addition the participants receive written confirmations of the execution of their orders at the 
uniform opening price. After the opening call, there is a continuous oral double-auction 
lasting seven minutes. During this period, the participants can place limit orders for one share 
each in continuous time, by announcing them verbally to the experimenter. The experimenter 
writes these offers on the board. The other players see and hear the occurrence of these orders. 
They can hit these orders by placing market orders or marketable limit orders. Whenever this 
is the case transactions take place, and this is observed by the other players. As long as their 
orders have not been hit, participants can cancel them. 
 
In the second treatment, the market starts with a seven-minute continuous oral double auction, 
followed by a closing call auction. Apart from this difference in the sequencing, the two 
treatments are identical. As discussed in Section 4, comparing the first and second treatments 
is useful to disentangle the impact of the different trading mechanisms (call versus 
continuous) from the impact of the sequencing (market close versus market opening). This is 
similar to the field data analysis of Amihud and Mendelson (1987, 1991). In their 1987 paper 
they found that transaction prices set during the opening call auction on the NYSE were 
particularly noisy. To test whether this was due to the trading mechanism (the call auction) or 
the opening of the market, in their 1991 paper they replicated their analysis with data from the 
Japanese market. While the opening call prices in the Tokyo stock exchange also included a 





If all market participants had the same utility function, the Milgrom & Stokey (1982) theorem 
would directly apply, and there should be no trade except at fully revealing prices, and hence 
no trading profits or losses. The intuition of this result is rather clear in our simple information 
structure: traders with bullish signals (“not 50”) might be inclined to buy, but, if they offer to 
purchase the security at prices above 240, they run the risk of trading with agents with bearish 
signals (“not 490”), earning arbitrage (i.e., riskless) profits at their expense. Consequently, 
traders who have observed “not 50” should not offer to buy at prices above 240. Extending 
this logic, Biais and Pouget (1999) show that even when traders have different preferences, 
there is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with no trade, except at fully revealing prices. In this 
equilibrium, traders who have observed “not 50” offer to buy at prices lower than or equal to 
240, traders who have observed “not 490” offer to sell at prices greater than or equal to 240, 
and traders who have observed “not 240” stay out of the market. Given that the others follow 
these strategies, deviating from them cannot be beneficial to a trader, as it would expose her 
to the strong winner’s curse risk of trading with an agent seeking to make arbitrage profits.  
 




We ran the experimental trading game with 26 different cohorts of students from Toulouse 
University and the London Business School (20 cohorts participated in the first treatment and 
6 in the second one). Participants were graduate students in economics, finance or 
management without previous exposure to experiments. For the Toulouse students, 7 cohorts 
were composed of students in the Masters in Finance (DESS de finance), 7 cohorts were 
composed of first year Ph.D students in management (DEA de Gestion), and 8 cohorts were 
composed of first year Ph.D students in financial economics (DEA Marchés et Intermédiaires 
Financiers). The 4 cohorts of students from the London Business School came from the MBA 
program or the Masters in Finance program. Among them many had experience as investment 
bankers or traders. Each cohort included between 8 and 18 participants. While 344 students 
participated in our trading game, our empirical analysis is only based on the 245 participants, 
for whom we have complete and reliable data for the trading game and answers to the 
psychological questionnaires described below. 94 of these participants were females and 151 
were males. Each cohort participated in 4 replications of the experiment. We randomly drew 
the realisations of the final value of the asset, by casting a dice in front of the students (so that 
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they would understand the draws were indeed random and i.i.d.). 
 
The rules of the game 
 
The rules of the game were presented to the participants in a one-hour session before the 
experiment. During this session the participants asked questions about the rules of the game. 
The experimenter endeavoured to answer all clarifying questions while refusing to discuss 
questions such as: How should I play? What should I do in this circumstance? Is this a good 
strategy? etc... We explained to the participants that we did not answer these questions in 
order not to influence their behaviour during the auction, we also announced that, after the 
experiments we would have a debriefing session where we would analyse the game together. 
At the beginning of an experimental session, each participant also received a written 
document stating the rules of the game (an example is displayed in Appendix 1). The 
experimenter reexplained the game to the participants, and they asked additional clarification 
questions. The participants were also handed forms to write down the orders they placed 
during the opening call, and to record their trades, cash balances and inventories during the 
continuous market. At the end of each replication the experimenter announced what was 
actually the realised value. Participants then computed their final wealth and the experimenter 




The experiment was run in the context of courses taught on stock markets. The experimenter 
told the students that their grade would reflect the final wealth they obtained in the 
experimental market. This was announced verbally and also stated in the written document 
handed to the students (see Appendix 1). This device is similar to Selten, Mitzkewitz and 
Uhlich (1997), Isaac, Walker and Williams (1994) and Williams (2003) who also used grades 
to incentivize participants in their experiments.5 For the Toulouse students, the grade for the 
course is between 0 and 20. There is a final exam, for which grades are typically between 6 
                                                 
5 Williams (2003) analyses experimental markets where participants are rewarded with credit points and obtains 
similar results to the literature using cash-rewards. In their experimental analysis of public goods, Isaac et al 
(1994) conclude (p 31-32): “The results of a series of (extra-credit, multiple-session) baseline experiments … are 
consistent with the (cash, single session) experimental results reported by Isaac and Walker (1988).”  
Furthermore, Camerer and Hogarth (1998), drawing the lessons of the experimental literature, conclude (page 8): 
“In the kind of tasks economists are most interested in, like trading in markets, bargaining in games and 
choosing among risky gambles, the overwhelming finding is that increased incentives do not change average 
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and 14. Students participating in 4 replications of the game earned bonus points (to be added 
to their final exam grade to determine the course grade) equal to the sum of their final wealth 
at the end of the four replications, minus 95000, divided by 3000. It turned out that the 
minimum number of bonus points earned in the experiment was close to 1 and the maximum 
close to 7. For the London Business School students, the total grade for the course is between 
0 and 100. The final exam is graded between 0 and 50, there is a presentation in class graded 
between 0 and 20, and in addition the students receive a number of points equal to the sum of 
their final wealth at the end of the four replications, minus 95000 and divided by 300. For 
both Toulouse and London students, the experiments took place before the final exam. We 
believe that rewarding participants based on exam grades, as opposed to relatively small 
amounts of money, is likely to induce serious, optimising behaviour, and to deter gambling or 
arbitrary attitudes. To avoid influencing the students into trades that they did not feel 
beneficial, we announced them during the description of the trading game that they did not 
have to place orders. 
 
2.3) Descriptive statistics 
 
Mean Absolute Deviations 
 
To document the informational efficiency of the prices set in our experimental market, we 
compute the mean absolute deviation between transaction prices and the true value of the 
asset. For the call auction, this mean is computed as a simple average across replications of 
the game, pooling all the cohorts together. On average, it is equal to 118. To compute the 
mean absolute deviation for the continuous double auction market, we use the weighted 
average transaction price, where the weights are the proportion of the transactions that 
occurred at each price. This is equal to 108.  
 
Figure 1 represents graphically the mean absolute deviation during the call auction and during 
the continuous double auction. As expected, the mean absolute deviation in the call auction 
(Panel A) is greater in the first treatment, where the call auction is held at the opening of the 
market, than in the second treatment, where the call auction is used to close the market. More 
surprisingly, in the continuous market (Panel B), the mean absolute deviation is lower when 
                                                                                                                                                        
behaviour substantially (although the variance of responses often decreases.)”  
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the market opens with the oral double auction. This suggests that this market structure could 
be more conducive of price discovery. Also the mean absolute deviation is lower when the 
value of the asset is equal to 240. In this case, indeed, all participants have observed rather 
strong and unambiguous signals, which facilitate price discovery. On the other hand, when the 
value is 490 or 50, while there is some price adjustment towards the true value, prices seem to 
remain somewhat “anchored” to the central possible asset value, 240.  
 
To document these points further, and study how informative transaction prices are about the 
true value, we computed the empirical joint distribution of prices and fundamental values, 
which is depicted in Figure 2. This figure illustrates that prices tend to be relatively higher 
when the value is 490, and relatively lower when the value is 50. Thus, the prices set in our 
experimental market under heterogeneous information do reveal part of the information of the 
traders. For example, when the call auction price is above 250, the actual value of the asset is 
never equal to 50, and there are seven chances out of 8 that it is equal to 490. Similarly, when 
the call auction price is lower than or equal to 220, the frequency of the low value realisation 
is 78%, while those of the intermediary and high values are 7% and 15%, respectively. The 
prices set in our experimental market are not fully revealing, however.6 In particular, the 
diagnosticity (or information content) of prices close to 240 is relatively low. For example, 
when the call price is greater than 220 and lower than or equal to 250, the frequency of the 
low value realisation is 17%, that of the intermediary value 52%, and that of the high value 
realisation 31%. Thus, when the call price falls in this interval there is only about one chance 
out of two that the actual value of the asset is 240.7 Hence, when the price is in this 




Table 1 presents summary statistics about the trading behaviour of the participants. Traders 
offer to buy or sell a median number of 11 shares during the call auction. Only 16 % of these 
offers are filled. This reflects the fact that traders place offers to buy at low prices and to sell 
at high prices which end up not executed. In the continuous market, participants offer to buy 
or sell a median number of two shares, and 70 % of these offers are filled. This relatively 
                                                 
6This contrasts with our theoretical analysis of the game, discussed above, where transaction prices should be 
fully revealing. This might stem from imperfect rationality.  
7Thus, when the value is 490, or when it is 50, the absolute deviation between the value and the price can be 
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large execution ratio reflects the finding that, in contrast with the call auction, traders in the 
continuous auction do not place buy orders at very low prices or sell orders at very high 
prices. In line with the zero-sum nature of the trading game, the median profit is equal to 0. 
While the median profit is null, some significant gains are earned and significant losses 
incurred in the trading game. In the call market, trading profits vary from -10 for the first 
quartile, to 145 for the third quartile. In the continuous market, profits vary from -79 for the 
first quartile, to 78 for the third quartile. In the above discussed Nash equilibrium of the 
trading game, rational agents will recognize the winner’s curse risk arising because of 
heterogeneous information and correspondingly design their strategies to cope with this. 
Hence, in equilibrium, no losses are incurred, and no profits earned. Yet, in practice in the 
experimental game, as shown in Table 1, large profits are made, and significant losses 
incurred. In the next sections we discuss how psychological factors can give rise to such 
phenomena. 
 
3) Psychological traits and judgmental biases 
 




The notion of overconfidence has been invoked in order to explain anomalies in investor 
predictions and behaviour (see Hilton, 2001 for a review). Several analyses in financial 
economics emphasize a form of overconfidence in one’s judgement known as miscalibration, 
corresponding to the tendency to overestimate the precision of one’s information. In the 
theoretical analysis of Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) overconfidence about 
the precision of private information can help explain under- and over-reactions in securities 
markets. Odean (1998) shows theoretically that miscalibration can lead to excessive trading 
volume. In line with this, Barber and Odean (2000b) offer empirical evidence that men trade 
more frequently than women and attribute this to their greater overconfidence.  
 
Our experimental analysis of the consequences of miscalibration in financial markets 
complements these theoretical and field data based approaches. Our focus on miscalibration 
                                                                                                                                                        
quite large, as illustrated in Figure 1.  
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does not of course imply that we consider other forms of overconfidence such as the better-
than-average effect and illusion of control to be less interesting or even less likely to influence 
financial behaviour. However, we do consider that there may be good grounds for 
differentiating these constructs. For example, Odean (1998) relies on two distinct parameters 
to model miscalibration and the better-than-average effect.8  
 
Our measure of miscalibration 
 
While the above mentioned studies can support the claim that cognitive biases influence 
market behaviour, they do not assess overconfidence in judgment directly. To directly analyse 
the consequences of miscalibration in financial markets, we rely on the measurement tools 
developed by the experimental psychology. To assess miscalibration, Lichtenstein, Fischhoff 
and Phillips (1982), Russo and Schoemaker (1992) and Klayman, Soll, Gonzales-Vallejo and 
Barlas (1999) use a confidence interval procedure in which participants are asked to make 
range predictions such that they are 90% sure that the actual value will fall within the range 
specified.  Miscalibrated participants typically give ranges that are too narrow, such that 
actual values fall outside the range more than 10 % of the time.9  For example, Russo and 
Schoemaker (1992) found that business managers had the correct answer within the stated 
range between 42% and  62% of the time. In Klayman, Soll, Gonzales-Vallejo and Barlas 
(1999), the correct answer fell inside the participants’ confidence range 43% of the time. 
Using the same procedure to elicit currency predictions, Stephan (1998) found similarly 
pronounced overconfidence in judgment even in a domain where the participants (Frankfurt 
currency traders) should have high expertise.  
 
In line with Russo and Schoemaker (1992) and Klayman, Soll, Gonzales-Vallejo and Barlas 
(1999), we used a confidence interval technique to measure miscalibration. Thus we asked 
participants, for ten items, to provide an upper and lower limit such that they were 90% sure 
the correct answer was between the two. The ten questions are listed in Appendix 2. While for 
                                                 
8Indeed, Régner, Hilton, Cabantous and Vautier (2003) offer empirical evidence that other forms of 
overconfidence, such as the better-than-average effect, the illusion of control or unrealistic optimism are not 
correlated with miscalibration.  
9 Underconfidence in one’s judgment can be obtained through designating confidence intervals that are too wide. 
This is especially likely to happen when the task is easy (Klayman et al., 1999).  However such miscalibration is 
hardly ever observed on difficult tasks. In our sample, only one person was actually underconfident, with no 
answer outside the confidence interval, and two persons were perfectly calibrated, with just one miss. 
Consequently for present purposes miscalibration can be considered as almost always indicating overconfidence 
in judgment. 
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rational participants the expected proportion of answers lying inside the confidence interval is 
90%, in our sample the average proportion of answers inside the confidence interval was 
36%. This shows that our participants exhibited over-confidence in their judgment. Note also 
that this percentage of miscalibration is very similar to those reported by Russo and 
Schoemaker (1992) and Klayman, Soll, Gonzales-Vallejo and Barlas (1999). In addition, we 
found no significant differences between men and women in terms of miscalibration. 
Specifically, the percentage of answers lying inside the confidence interval is 37% for men 
and 34 % for women. The t-statistic for the difference between these two averages (1.08) is 
not significantly different from 0. This result is in line with other studies of miscalibration 
which similarly found little or no gender differences (e.g. Jonsson and Allwood, 2003; 
Gigerenzer, Hoffrage and Kleinbolting, 1991; and Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and Phillips, 
1982.10) Because we measure miscalibration independently from gender, we can examine the 
respective impacts of these two characteristics on financial behaviour in a controlled 
experimental setting. 
 
In our econometric analysis, we use the level of miscalibration of the participants - measured 
as the proportion of questions for which the true answers falls outside the stated range - as an 
explanatory variable for their trading behaviour and performance. While the mean degree of 
overconfidence in our 245 participants sample was 64%, the minimum was 0, the first quartile 
was 50%, the median is 70%, the third quartile was 80%, and the maximum was 100%. Thus 
the degree of overconfidence varies markedly across individuals. 
 
Psychometric issues  
 
Using individual measures of miscalibration to explain the participants’ trading strategies and 
performance is appropriate only if miscalibration is a stable trait, which persists over time and 
generalises across different kinds of judgmental task. Recent psychological research has 
offered evidence that this is indeed the case. Klayman, Soll, Gonzales-Vallejo and Barlas 
(1999) show that questions requesting a subjective confidence interval (such as those we use 
in the present paper) elicit a strong and stable bias. They conclude (page 240): “Clearly, there 
                                                 
10For example, while Gigerenzer, Hoffrage and Kleinbolting (1991) note that "Sex differences in degree of 
overconfidence in knowledge have been claimed by both philosophy and folklore" they go on to observe that 




are strong, stable individual differences in overconfidence in this task”, that is, the answers of 
different individuals typically reflect different levels of overconfidence, and the tendency of 
each individual to express overconfident judgements tends to be stable over time and over 
tasks (see also Jonsson and Allwood, 2003).  Parker and Fischhoff (2001) analyse individual 
differences in cognitive styles, and offer evidence of stable individual differences in 
miscalibration. Their psychometric study shows that accurate calibration is one of the stable 
and most significant ingredients of decision making competence. Finally, psychometric 
research has also shown that miscalibration is distinct from intelligence – indeed Stanovich 
and West (1998) report a modest negative correlation (-.20) between intelligence and good 
calibration. In our sample, for 42 participants, IQ test scores were also available.  In line with 
earlier results obtained by the psychometric literature, the correlation coefficient between this 
score and our measure of miscalibration is very low (.01). 
 
One way to assess the internal psychometric validity of a measurement scale is to compute its 
Cronbach alpha. The intuitive meaning of this measure can be explained as follows. Suppose 
you measure one variable based on the answers to 10 questions, or items. It is desirable that 
the ten items point in the same direction, i.e., that they be well correlated. One way to check 
that would be to measure the correlation, across participants, between their average answer to 
the first five questions and their average answer to the last five questions. This is referred to 
as the split-half correlation. Of course, comparing the first five and last five questions is 
arbitrary. For example, why not comparing the answers to even questions and odd questions 
instead? Cronbach alpha is the mean of all split-half correlations among items. The 
corresponding formula is: 
 
α = [M/(M-1)] [1 – (Σj=1M Var(xj))/Var(Σj=1Mxj))], 
 
where M is the number of items, xj is the jth item, and variances are computed across 
participants. Intuitively, α is a synthetic measure of the correlation between the items, and 
varies between 0 and 1. If the items are independent, α =0, and if they are perfectly correlated 
it is equal to 1. In our data, the Cronbach alpha coefficient of our measure of overconfidence 
is 0.58. This suggests the different items we use to measure miscalibration tend to be 





Miscalibration leads to overconfidence in the precision of one’s information, i.e., 
miscalibrated agents underestimate conditional uncertainty.11 In our simple information 
structure there is little scope for exaggerating the precision of one’s private signal, but 
miscalibrated agents can exaggerate the precision of their information set, including their 
signal as well as market outcomes, such as transaction prices, which they fail to interpret 
correctly.12 
 
For example, if the opening price is equal or close to 240, miscalibrated traders may 
exaggerate the probability that the true value is 240.13 As discussed above, prices close to 240 
are unreliable indicators of underlying value in our experimental market. Indeed, when the 
opening price is greater than 220 and lower than or equal to 250, there is only about one 
chance out of two that the actual value of the asset is 240. We expect miscalibrated traders, 
unaware of this large conditional uncertainty,  to be especially vulnerable to the winner’s 
curse. Given transaction prices close to 240, they will overconfidently believe that the value is 
240 if their own signal does not rule out this value. They will trade on this belief, risking 
being picked off by rational traders. 
  
We argue that the process underlying the formation of overconfident beliefs in the trading 
game is similar to that underlying the formation of overconfident judgements when answering 
the calibration questionnaire. Both reflect overestimation of the diagnosticity of informational 
cues, and underestimation of conditional uncertainty. For example, a salient cue in the 
question about Martin Luther King’s age at death would be that he was a famous political 
leader. Overconfident respondents who underestimate the variability in ages of famous 
political leaders accordingly overestimate the diagnosticity of this cue, and thus provide 
excessively narrow confidence intervals for their answer to the question. Likewise, we expect 
                                                 
11 This is in line with the finding that miscalibration is correlated with intolerance of ambiguity, the tendency to 
believe, for example, that things are black and white rather than various shades of grey (see e.g. Lichtenstein, 
Fischhoff and Phillips, 1982; Regner et al. 2003).  
12 Our emphasis on the adverse consequences of underestimating conditional uncertainty shares similarities with 
that of Odean (1998). However, while he emphasises overestimation of the precision of private signals, we 
analyse overconfidence in the information content of transaction prices, which is public information in our 
experimental market.  
13 In the continuous market such conditioning can arise because the agent observes the transaction price. In the 
call auction, agents place demand and supply schedule specifying the number of shares they want to trade at a 
given price. This demand should reflect the information content of the price, as shown, e.g., by Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1980). 
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that in the trading game miscalibrated agents will similarly overestimate the diagnosticity of 
market cues, such as the market opening at or around 240. Correspondingly they will 
underestimate the conditional variance of the true value in this case, and thus the probability 
that the true value is in fact 50 or 490.  
 
In line with the above discussion, we posit the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Miscalibrated participants tend to suffer more from the winner’s curse, and 
correspondingly should earn lower trading profits. 
 
3.2) Self -Monitoring 
 
Definition and hypothesis 
 
While miscalibration is a concept that has been principally developed in cognitive 
psychology, the concept of self-monitoring has received more attention in social psychology. 
It reflects the disposition to attend to social cues, and to adjust one’s behaviour to what is 
expected in one’s social environment (see Snyder and Gangestad, 1986). Parker and Fischhoff 
(2001) note that “decision making competence should correlate positively with self-
monitoring … representing awareness of one’s own actions.” Self-monitoring has been 
applied to management (see for example DeBono and Snyder (1985) for advertising and 
Berscheid, Matwychuk and Snyder (1984) and Jenkins (1993) for human resources 
management.)  It has been shown to correlate positively with performance. For example, 
Kilduff and Day (1994) showed that high self-monitors are more likely to be promoted in 
managerial careers than low self-monitors. Mehra, Kilduff and Brass (2001) find that high 
self-monitoring has positive effects on individual’s workplace performance. 
 
There is a behavioural aspect and a perception aspect to self monitoring. High self monitors 
can be thought of as impression managers whose behaviour is strategically attuned to create 
impressions that gain them advantage in a given situation. In the context of the trading game, 
this would correspond to a more strategic and manipulative behaviour. High self monitors 
would place orders enabling them to make profits without revealing their private information 
to the other market participants. They might also make offers that do not reflect their own 
beliefs or signals, but which aim to manipulate others' beliefs and perceptions. 
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In addition, Monson (1983) reports evidence consistent with a projection effect: that is, high 
self monitors expect others to be like them. Specifically, they are more likely to interpret 
others' behaviour as stemming from situational constraints rather than revealing internal 
dispositions or values. By analogy, in the market game they may assume that other market 
participants are also behaving strategically and trying to manipulate the market as they 
themselves do. Accordingly, high self monitors should be less likely to take market prices at 
face value, and will reason about the signals and strategies that generated them. They will thus  
be less likely “to underestimate the extent to which other players’ actions are correlated with 
their information” (Eyster and Rabin, 2003) and thus should avoid the winner’s curse. 
Specifically, in contrast to highly miscalibrated agents, conditional on prices close to 240, 
they will not so readily jump to the conclusion that the value is 240.14 
 
In line with the above discussion, we posit the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Participants higher in self-monitoring should be better able to trade strategically and 
suffer less from the winner's curse, and correspondingly they should earn greater trading 
profits.  
 
Measurement and Psychometric issues 
 
Jenkins (1993) offers evidence suggesting that self-monitoring is a stable personality trait 
throughout one’s life span. Snyder and Gangestad (1986) have developed (and checked the 
psychometric validity of) a scale to measure this construct. In the present paper we directly 
import their 18-item questionnaire (presented in Appendix 2).  We measure the degree of self-
monitoring as the percentage of questions (out of 18) for which the answer indicated high 
self-monitoring. While the mean degree of self-monitoring in our 245 participants sample was 
47%, the minimum was 0, the first quartile was 33%, the median 44%, the third quartile was 
61%, and the maximum was 100%. Thus the degree of self-monitoring varies across 
individuals. The average self-monitoring score is 51% for men and 41 % for women. The t-
statistic for the difference between these two averages (-4.01) is significantly different from 0, 
                                                 
14 This implies that high self-monitors will set wider "confidence intervals" for signals coming from social 
sources (as in our experimental market), though it does not necessarily imply that they will do the same for non-
social sources (e.g. general knowledge questions). 
  18
which suggests men are higher self-monitors than women. 
 
In our 245  participants sample, the coefficient of Cronbach's alpha for the self-monitoring 
scale is 0.70, which points at reasonable internal consistency of the measure. Furthermore, the 
correlation between the index of self-monitoring and the miscalibration score was quite low, 
as it equalled 0.0073. This suggests that the two constructs are quite distinct. Finally note that, 
for the 42 participants for whom we observed a measure of IQ, the correlation between IQ and 
self-monitoring was found to be low, as it was estimated to be equal to -0.11. 
 
4) Psychological determinants of trading performance 
 
In this section we test the above discussed hypotheses on the consequences of psychological 
traits on trading performance. Trading outcomes are averaged across the four replications of 
the experiment. To filter out some of the noise in the data, we focus on the deviations between 
the psychological traits of the participants and those of the group in which they traded. More 
precisely we take the following steps: we compute the average trait for each of the 26 cohorts. 
Then, for each participant, we compute the difference between his or her trait and the 
corresponding cohort average, and we divide it by the cohort average. Thus the variable can 
be interpreted in terms of percentage difference with the cohort average. 
  
4.1) Univariate analysis 
 
Miscalibration & trading profits 
 
To document the link between miscalibration and trading profit, we broke the population into 
four groups or quartiles, each composed of 25% of the participants, and ranked in terms of 
miscalibration. Thus the first quartile is composed of the least miscalibrated participants, 
while the fourth quartile is composed of the most miscalibrated participants. Figure 3 plots the 
average trading profits of each of the four quartiles. Clearly, the more miscalibrated the 
participants, the lower their trading profits. For example the average trading profit of the first 
quartile (composed of the 25% least miscalibrated participants) is 131.36, while the 
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corresponding average for the fourth quartile (composed of the most miscalibrated 
participants) is -147.67. The t-statistic for the difference between these two averages is 3.17. 
 
While the above results clearly suggest that miscalibration impedes performance, consistent 
with hypothesis H1, one might wonder about the robustness of this result. To speak to this 
issue, we replicated the analysis presented in Figure 3, breaking down the observations in 3 
subsamples. Our experimental analysis was first conducted with students from Toulouse 
University. Then we replicated this analysis with students from the London Business School. 
Finally, after the first round of the reviewing process, we collected data from a new sample of 
participants. Comparing the results obtained for these three populations enables one to assess 
whether the results obtained for the first Toulouse sample are robust out of that sample. 
Figure 4 depicts the average trading profits of each miscalibration quartile for the three 
subsamples. It shows that the negative association between miscalibration and performance is 
robust across samples. In particular, in each of the three subsamples, the least miscalibrated 
agents obtain large positive profits. Note however that the strength of the impact of 
miscalibration on performance varies across subsamples. In particular, it is more pronounced 
for the LBS students. 
 
As discussed above, miscalibration does not significantly differ across gender. Yet it might 
affect performance differently, to the extent that male and female participants could act upon 
their more or less miscalibrated views of the world in different ways. To answer this question 
we replicated the analysis presented in Figure 3, breaking down the observations by gender. 
The results are depicted in Figure 5. The figure suggests that miscalibration has a more 




Self-monitoring & trading profits 
 
As in our analysis of miscalibration, we broke the population into four groups or quartiles, 
each composed of 25% of the participants, and ranked, this time, in terms of self-monitoring. 
Thus the first quartile is composed of the lowest self-monitors, while the fourth quartile is 
composed of the highest self monitors. Figure 6 plots the average trading profits of each of the 
four quartiles. It illustrates that high self-monitors tend to earn greater profits. For example 
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the average trading profit of the first quartile (composed of the 25% lowest self-monitors) is -
62.45, while the corresponding average for the fourth quartile (composed of the highest self-
monitors) is 53.78. The t-statistic for the difference between these two averages is only 1.18, 
because the variance within each quartile is large. 
 
These results provide some support to the hypothesis that self-monitoring enhances 
performance (H2). To assess the robustness of the link between self-monitoring and 
performance, we replicated the analysis breaking down the observation in 3 subsamples, 
corresponding to the first round of data collection in Toulouse, the LBS replication, and the 
second Toulouse sample. Figure 7 depicts the average trading profits of each self-monitoring 
quartile for the three subsamples. The positive association between self-monitoring and 
performance is more or less upheld. It shows up quite strongly in the LBS sample. It is less 
obvious in the second Toulouse sample, where the highest self-monitors earn the highest 
profits but where the lowest self-monitors also earn positive profits. 
 
As discussed above, the impact of miscalibration on performance differs across gender. Is it 
also the case for self-monitoring? To investigate that point we replicated the analysis 
presented in Figure 6, breaking down the observations by gender. The results are depicted in 
Figure 8. The figure suggests that self-monitoring affects profits for men, but not  for women.  
 
4.2) Multivariate analysis 
 
The basic regressions 
 
To analyse these points further we regressed trading profits (averaged across the four 
replications of the game) onto the two psychological variables. We also include in the 
regressors the gender of the participants.15  Because all the variables are centred, there is no 
intercept in the regression.  
 
The first column of Table 2 presents the estimates for the basic specification. Consistently 
with H1, miscalibration significantly reduces profits. The coefficient of self-monitoring is 
                                                 
15 We have also conducted the analysis including additional control variables, such as the degree in which the 
students were enrolled, and the number of players in their cohort. Overall these variables were not significant, 
and they did not alter the sign, magnitude or significance of the psychological variables. Hence, for parsimony, 
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positive,  consistent with hypothesis H2, but not significantly so. These results are in the line 
of our discussion of Figures 3 and 6 above.  
 
Winner’s curse traps 
 
In Section 3.1, we identified a scenario in which overconfidence in judgment was likely to be 
particularly harmful. Our conjecture was the following: when transaction prices are close to 
240, miscalibrated agents exaggerate the probability that the value is 240, when their own 
private signal does not rule it out. They place orders reflecting this view of the market. These 
orders are picked off by more rational agents. Thus, miscalibrated agents suffer from the 
winner’s curse and correspondingly incur losses. In Section 3.2, we also conjectured that high 
self monitors should be less likely to fall in such winner’s curse traps. Indeed, as discussed 
above, they are likely to be more strategic and less likely to take market prices at face value 
and jump to the conclusion that prices close to 240 can only mean that the value is 240. 
 
To test these hypotheses, we need to empirically characterize the occurrence of winner’s curse 
traps. We define a winner’s curse trap as follows: the opening call auction price is strictly 
greater than 220 and lower than or equal to 260, but the true value is not 240, and yet the 
participant’s signal does not rule out 240. We then split our sample into two subsamples. The 
first one includes the 98 participants who were never exposed to a winner’s curse trap. The 
second one includes the 84 participants who faced at least one winner’s curse trap. We run the 
regression of profits on the psychological variables and gender separately in the two 
subsamples. This additional statistical analysis can be performed only for the first treatment 
sample because in the second treatment we did not collect data on the signals observed by the 
participants.16  
 
The estimates are in the last two columns of Table 2. While the miscalibration and the self-
monitoring interaction variables are significant in the subsample of participants who faced 
winner’s curse traps, they are not significantly different from zero in the other subsample. In 
the sample where winners’ curse traps occurred the adjusted R2 is more than twice as large as 
                                                                                                                                                        
we decided not to include them in the final regressions. 
16 This was due to the fact that one of the experimenters, Pouget, was not present in the second set of 
experiments, and it was difficult in practice to collect all the data. Note however that the first treatment is a 
natural setting for the winner’s curse trap to operate, as the opening call auction prices is a natural anchor for the 
beliefs formed in this market.  
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in the grand sample. This suggests that the winner’s curse traps are the major channel of the 




The regression estimates presented in Table 2 indicate that trading profits do not differ 
significantly across genders. Does that imply that gender does not affect behaviour and 
performance in our experimental market? 
 
Barber and Odean (2001) analysed trades placed by individual investors through a discount 
broker. They found that men traded more than women and showed that such frequent trading 
did not enhance gross portfolio performance. 18 Thus, after deducting trading costs, they found 
that the performance of women was superior to that of men. They concluded that men’s lower 
performance was due to overconfidence.  
 
To further compare the behaviour arising in our experimental market to that observed in the 
field by Barber and Odean (2001), we study the determinants of trading activity in our data. 
We consider two possible measures of trading activity: the number of shares offered or 
demanded by a trader, and the number of shares actually traded. We regress trading activity 
on the two psychological variables, as well as on gender. The estimates, presented in Table 3, 
imply that men participate significantly more actively in the market than women.19 This result 
replicates in our experimental setting the field data results of Barber and Odean (2001). The 
estimates in Table 3 also suggest there is no significant association between miscalibration or 
self-monitoring and trading frequency.20 The lack of association between miscalibration (as 
measured by our method of confidence intervals) and trading frequency has also been found 
in field data (Glaser and Weber, 2003). 
 
                                                 
17 For the sake of comparison, the second column of Table 2 presents the results of the profit regression for the 
first treatment sample without splitting it according to the occurrence of winner’s curse traps. 
18 Note however that, using a different statistical approach for Finnish individual traders, Grinblatt and Keloharju 
(2001) find that gender is unrelated to the propensity to sell.  
19 For completeness, we also ran the regression, as in the analysis of trading profits, separately for the first 
treatment, and splitting the sample according to the occurrence of winner’s curse traps. The signs of the 
coefficient estimates are unchanged across specifications.  
20 We also ran the regression separately for the male and female subsamples. In both cases we found that 
overconfidence did not increase trading activity. While self monitoring is not significantly related to trading 
activity in the male sample, it significantly increases it in the female sample. 
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It should be noted that the nature of transaction costs differs in our analysis and in Barber and 
Odean (1997). In their analysis, transaction costs are imputed by the researchers to each trade. 
Hence there is a mechanical link between trading frequency and costs. In the present paper, 
transaction costs arise endogenously because of winner’s curse effects. Hence there is no 
mechanical link between trading frequency and costs. Thus, the same stylised fact, namely 
that men trade more than women, has different consequences for transaction costs and thus 
trading performance in their analysis and ours. 
 
While we find no direct consequence of gender on miscalibration or trading performance, a 
more complex relationship between psychological variables, gender and performance may 
exist. Figures 5 and 8 suggest that psychological variables affect performance for men, not for 
women. To analyse this issue further, we ran the regression of trading profits onto 
psychological variables separately for male and female participants. The estimates are in 
Table 4.  
 
The first column presents the estimates for the basic specification. Miscalibration significantly 
reduces the trading profits of men (the point estimate is -465.12, with a t-statistic of -3.7), 
while the positive impact of self-monitoring on profits is not significant (the point estimate is 
184.68, with a t-statistic of 1.7). The results obtained in the female subsample are quite 
different: the coefficients of miscalibration and self-monitoring are much smaller (-149.47 
and -32.56 respectively), and both are insignificant (the t-statistics are -1.49 and -0.34 
respectively). The two middle columns of the table present the results obtained for the first 
treatment subsample and the second treatment subsample. In both cases, miscalibration 
significantly hurts men, not women.21 The last two columns of Table 4 document the different 
reaction of men and women to winner’s curse traps. The psychological characteristics of male 
participants strongly influence their reaction to winner’s curse traps, which is reflected by 
high t-statistics for the psychological variables, and relatively large adjusted R2. In contrast, 
the trading performance of female participants facing winners’ curse traps is not significantly 
affected by the psychological variables.  
 
To summarize: while men and women do not significantly differ in terms of miscalibration, 
                                                 
21 One of the reasons why the effect of psychological variables is weaker in the second treatment data, pooling 
the two genders maybe that, in that subsample, the proportion of women (56%) is larger than in the subsample 
corresponding to the first treatment (35%). 
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their propensity to act on their miscalibrated beliefs is different, and this leads to different 





For 42 participants from the Masters in Finance at Toulouse University, IQ measures were 
available (as they were used to select the students for the program). This offers an opportunity 
to study if there are links between the psychological characteristics we analyse, gender, 
trading performance and IQ. For example, one can study if cognitive abilities, such as 
calibration, matter in the game because they are a proxy for general intelligence. To conduct 
this analysis, we regressed trading profits onto psychological characteristics and IQ measures. 
Since, as shown above, men and women behave differently in the game, we estimated the 
regressions separately for the two genders. The results are in Table 5. Even after including IQ 
measures, miscalibration significantly reduces trading performance for men, but not for 
women. This points to the robustness of our results and the unique role played by 
miscalibration for male performance in the experimental financial market. The estimates in 
Table 5 suggest that IQ does not impact significantly the performance of men. For women, the 
point estimate is significant and rather large, and the t-stat (weakly) suggests that higher 
intelligence may enhance the performance of female participants. We find the complex 
pattern of results obtained for men and women to be intriguing, and of similar complexity to 
those obtained by Gysler, Kruse and Schubert (2002) in their experimental study of gender 
differences in miscalibration, ambiguity and risk aversion. This suggests that further research 
and more systematic data collection could shed interesting light on the issue of gender, 
psychological characteristics and economic performance.  
 
4.5) Call and continuous markets 
 
Our experimental market includes a call batch auction and a continuous limit order market. 
The data used for the first version of this paper was collected in the context of an 
experimental market starting with an opening call auction and then continuing with a 
continuous market. We chose this market structure because it is similar to that of many of the 
major stock exchanges in the world: Eurex in Frankfurt, Euronext in Paris, Brussels and 
Amsterdam, or SETS in London.  
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The estimates of the regression of trading profits onto psychological variables and gender for 
this first experimental treatment are in the first two columns of Table 6. The coefficients of 
the psychological variables are large and significant in the call market, and smaller and 
insignificant in the continuous market. Two effects could contribute to this difference: 
 
i) The call auction in the first experimental treatment is at the opening of the market, where 
the uncertainty about the value of the asset is maximal. It could be that the impact of 
psychological traits on trading performance is stronger when there is more uncertainty. 
 
ii) The call market involves different thought processes than the continuous market. In the 
former, traders have to reason about the order placement strategies of the others and about the 
determination of transaction prices by the confrontation of supply and demand curves. The 
continuous market is much simpler. There is no uncertainty about the transaction price, which 
is simply the price of the limit order chosen by the participant who placed it, and observed by 
the others. When they decide to initiate a trade, by hitting a limit order, participants do not 
have to imagine the orders that have been placed by the others, they can observe them 
directly. Thus, the call auction is cognitively more demanding than the continuous market. 
This could be why psychological variables matter more in the former than in the latter. 
 
To test which of these two effects was at the root of the results we obtained, we collected new 
data in a second experimental treatment, where the market opened with a continuous auction 
and closed with a call auction. If the difference between the call and continuous markets 
observed in the first treatment reflected the sequencing of these mechanisms (explanation i)), 
we should observe a reversal of the results in the second treatment: psychological variables 
should have greater and more significant coefficients in the opening continuous market than 
in the closing call auction. If the difference was due to the difference in cognitive demands 
between the two markets (explanation ii)), we should obtain similar results in the second 
treatments as in the first one.  
 
The four columns of Table 6 presents the estimates of the regression of trading profits on our 
two psychological variables and on gender in the four possible market settings: opening call, 
ensuing continuous market, opening continuous market, closing call.  
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There is no strong reversal of the results, i.e., it is not the case that, in the second treatment, 
psychological variables matter in the opening continuous market and not in the closing call 
auction. The point estimate of the coefficient of overconfidence in the call auction is only 
slightly lower (in absolute value) in the second treatment (-245.55) than in the first (-281.94).  
The point estimate of the coefficient of overconfidence in the continuous market is larger (in 
absolute value) in the second treatment (-115.15) than in the first (-76.33), but it remains 
lower than in the call auction. Lower significance of the estimates in the second treatment can 
in part be due to the smaller number of observations. 
 
To summarise: our results suggest that the impact of psychological variables is greater in the 
call auction because it is a more complex trading mechanism. The impact of the psychological 
variables in the call auction is magnified at the opening, because price discovery has not been 




This paper experimentally analysed the consequences of psychological variables for financial 
behaviour. We focused on two psychological traits which have been extensively studied in 
experimental and social-personality psychology. Miscalibration is a form of judgemental 
overconfidence consisting in overestimation of the precision of one’s information. Self-
monitoring is a form of attentiveness to social cues. Using psychological questionnaires, we 
measured these two variables for 245 participants and also observe their behaviour in an 
experimental financial market. In this experimental market, similar to that analysed by Plott 
and Sunder (1988), the true value of the asset can be high (490), medium (240) or low (50) 
and traders receive heterogeneous private signals which enable them to rule out one of the 
three values.  
 
We formulated two hypotheses: we expected miscalibrated traders, underestimating the 
conditional uncertainty of the asset value, to be especially vulnerable to the winner’s curse. 
We also expected high self-monitors to behave strategically and achieve superior results. 
Empirically, we found that miscalibration reduces and self-monitoring enhances trading 
performance. We identified situations where winner’s curse effects should be particularly 
severe. These arise when the price is close to 240, but the true value isn’t. In such 
circumstances, traders with private signal “not 50” or “not 490” will fall in a winner’s curse 
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trap if they overconfidently believe that the true value is 240. We find that miscalibrated 
participants obtain lower profits in such circumstances. In contrast high self-monitors succeed 
in avoiding these winner’s curse traps, consistent with the hypothesis that self monitoring 
facilitates game theoretic reasoning. Our experiment offers an opportunity to study the 
relationships between gender, psychological variables and trading performance. Men are not 
found to be more miscalibrated than women. On the other hand, while psychological 
characteristics do no significantly affect the profits of female participants, miscalibration 
significantly reduces the performance of men.  
 
Both psychologists (e.g. Taylor and Brown, 1988) and economists (e.g. Bénabou and Tirole, 
2003) have argued that positive illusions such as inflated self-esteem and optimism may lead 
individuals to attain better outcomes, for example through motivating them to work harder 
and persist when the going gets tough.22 However, our experimental results suggest that 
realism can produce more positive outcomes in market situations in which agents compete 
and where perspicacity and accuracy in judgment may count for more than motivation and 
persistence. This is in line with psychological studies which show that realism facilitates 
performance when accuracy of judgment is important for selecting successful effort 
investment strategies (Försterling and Morganstern, 2002). Similar findings have been 
obtained in economic domains. For example, Fenton O'Creevy et al. (1998) measured the 
illusion of control of traders working in London-based investment banks through their 
tendency to overestimate their ability to influence the movement of a point on a screen which 
they in fact did not control. They found that traders prone to this form of illusion of control 
were indeed judged by their desk managers to earn less.  A similar demonstration of the 
negative effect of inflated self-assessments on economic performance comes from Camerer 
and Lovallo’s (1999) experimental finding that being led to overestimate one’s chances of 
success on a new venture relative to others leads to excessive market entry and financial 
losses. Finally, using field data, Landier and Thesmar (2003) show that firms started by 
optimistic entrepreneurs (who have a higher tendency to overestimate their firm’s chances of 
success relative to others in the same business category) tend to grow less, die sooner and be 
less profitable. In sum, the markets studied seem to punish – not reward – miscalibration and 
positive illusions. 
 
                                                 
22 See also Aspinwall and Taylor (1992) and Murray and Holmes (1997). 
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Our methodology, which involves directly measuring psychological traits and correlating 
them with economic behaviour, could prove useful to shed light on the impact of 
psychological variables in various economic situations. For example, it could be interesting in 
future work to study when, why and how particular forms of overconfidence will influence  
economic behaviour. For example, Glaser and Weber (2003) find that frequency of trading in 
their field data is predicted by measures of the better-than-average effect but not by 
miscalibration. In addition, we suggest that high self-monitors were more successful in our 
experimental market because they are better able to engage in game-theoretic reasoning, and 
in particular to anticipate the link between the signals of the other players and their actions. It 
would be interesting to investigate further the relation between self-monitoring and the ability 
of players to estimate the correlation between the actions of others and their information. 
Indeed, as shown theoretically by Eyster and Rabin’s (2003), underestimation of this 
correlation leads to winner’s curse and trade in adverse-selection settings where conventional 
analysis predicts no trade. An interesting avenue of research would also be to consider other 
traits than those analysed in the present paper.23 Finally, another promising direction would be 
to study how different market structures moderate or exacerbate the consequences of 
psychological characteristics.24 Systematic studies to answer these questions could help yield 
a body of knowledge able to complement classical mechanism design based on insights from 




                                                 
23 In the context of the present paper, we tried to measure such cognitive biases as the confirmation, availability 
and representativeness biases. Unfortunately, our measures of these biases had insufficient psychometric validity 
(i.e., they were too noisy), to be included in the present analysis. Camerer (1987) and Anderson and Sunder 
(1995) offer interesting analyses of the consequences of the representativeness bias. It could be interesting, in 
further research, to build on their approach, or on the theoretical analysis of confirmatory bias offered by Rabin 
and Schrag (1999). Hirshleifer (2001) discusses several psychological biases in relation with financial markets. 
24 Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber (1986) offer an interesting analysis of how market environments can 
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Table 1: Summary statistics on the behaviour of the participants in the trading game 
Average across the four replications of the game 
 
 






during the call 




0 1 2 4 21 
Execution ratio 
during the call  




0 50% 70% 89% 100% 
Trading profits 
during the call 


















Table 2:  
Regression of trading profits onto psychological traits and control variables 
 




Note: For these analyses we consider a winner’s curse trap to exist where the call price is 

















Total trading profits 
for participants who 
never faced a 
winner’s curse trap 
(1st treatment  only) 
Total trading profits 
for participants who 
faced at least one 
winner’s curse trap 



























Adjusted R2 6.52% 6.47% 0 % 16.74 % 
Number of 
observations 









Table 3:  
Regression of trading activity onto psychological traits and control variables 
 





Note: For these analyses we consider a winner’s curse trap to exist where the call price is 























who never faced 







faced at least one 
winner’s curse trap

































Adjusted R2 4.92% 2.3% 2.6% 0% 2.52% 
Number of 
observations 











Table 4:  
Regression of trading profits onto psychological traits and control variables for men and 
women separately 
 
(t stat are in parenthesis) 
 
 
 Total trading 
profits  





































































Adj. R2 9.44% 0.34% 9.58% 0.85% 9.8% 0 0 0 23.12% 0 
Number 
of obs. 
151 94 123 59 28 35 64 34 59 25 
 
 
Note: For these analyses we consider a winner’s curse trap to exist where the call price is 


















Table 5:  
Regression of trading profits onto Miscalibration, self-monitoring and IQ 
For men and women 
 























Adjusted R2 19.79% 7% 





 Table 6: Regression of trading profits onto psychological traits and control variables 
in various market structures 
 
(t stat are in parenthesis) 
 
 
 Trading profits 
(1st treatment only) 
Trading profits 
(2nd treatment only) 








































Proportion of signals 






Adjusted R2 7.72% 1.42% 1.60% 1.53% 










Instructions to the participants in the trading game 
 
 
In this trading game you will have the opportunity to buy and sell shares. The instructions of 
the game are below. If you follow them carefully and make good decisions you can win a 
considerable amount of points for your final grade.   
 
You will play 4 replications of the trading game. At the beginning of each replication you will 
receive 25000 francs and 4 shares. During the game you will have the opportunity to place 
orders to buy or sell the shares. (You can sell more shares than you own, i.e., short sales are 
allowed).  At the end of each replication, you will compute the value of your final wealth, 
equal to the sum of: 
 
your initial cash: 25000 F, 
 
minus the cost of your share purchases, 
 
plus the proceeds from your share sales, 
 
plus the final value of your portfolio. 
 
The final value of your portfolio is equal to the number of shares you own at the end of the 
replication, multiplied by the final value of each share. The final value of the shares, at the 
end of each replication, is drawn randomly (and independently from the previous draws). It 
can be 490, 240 or 50, with equal probability: one third.  For example, if your only trade was 
the purchase of one share at price 200, and the final value of the shares is 240, your final 
wealth is: 25000 - 200 + 5* 240. Since you can sell more shares than you own, you can end 
up with a negative number of shares held at the end of the replication. For example, if you 
sold 6 shares at 100  each and the final value of the shares is 50, your final wealth is: 25000 
+600 - 2*50, given that you have sold 2 shares more than you owned.   
 
At the beginning of each replication you will receive a private information (keep it secret, 
don't reveal it to the others !).  If the value of the shares is 490, half the players know it is not 
240, while the others know it is not 50.  If the value of the shares is 240, half the players know 
it is not 490, while the others know it is not 50.  If the value of the shares is 50, half the 
players know it is not 240, while the others know it is not 490. 
 
Each replication of the trading game includes two phases: 
 
First, you can place limit orders to buy or sell (up to 10 shares at each price), by writing them 
on a piece of paper. These orders are then aggregated into supply and demand curves, crossed 
to determine the opening price, in a call auction.  The opening price is set to maximise trading 
volume, as explained in class. This price, but not the orders, is announced publicly to the 
players. After this announcement, you receive execution reports, telling you which of your 
orders are filled. All limit sell orders placed at prices below or equal to the opening price are 
executed at this price.  All limit buy orders placed at prices above or equal to this price are 
executed at the opening price.  The remaining orders are not executed. For simplicity, they are 
automatically cancelled after the opening call.   
  40
 
Second there is continuous market, which lasts 7 minutes, during which you will have the 
opportunity to: 
 
 announce offers to sell or buy, which I will write on the board (to make life easier for 
me when I write the offers on the board, they are all for one share only, but you can place 
many offers), 
 
 announce that you desire to trade with one of the offers available on the board, and 
which have not been executed yet; cancel or revise your offers when they have not been 
executed yet. 
 
After the 4 replications, you will compute the sum of your final wealth during the game. To 
obtain the number of bonus points to be then added to your grade at the exam, subtract 95000 





















  Martin Luther King’s age at death.   
 Length of the Nile River 
(in miles). 
  
 Number of countries that are 
members of OPEC. 
  
 Number of books in the Old 
Testament. 
  
 Weight of an empty Boeing 747 
(kgs).  
  
 Year in which J.S. Bach was born.   
 Gestation period (in days) of an 
Asian elephant. 
  
 Diameter of the moon (in miles).   
 Air distance from London to 
Tokyo. 
  
 Deepest known point in the  









Self-Monitoring (Snyder and Gangestad, 1986) 
 
For each of the following questions, we code 1 if the answer reflects self-monitoring, and 0 otherwise. Our 





  False 
 
I find it hard to imitate the behaviour of other people. 
  




I can only argue for ideas, which I already believe. 
  








I would probably make a good actor. 
  
  
In a group of people I am rarely the centre of attention.  
  
 In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons.   
  
I am not particularly good at making other people like me. 
  
  
I’m not always the person I appear to be. 
  
 I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone or 
win their favour. 
  
  
I have considered being an entertainer.  
  
 
I have never been good at games like charades or improvisations.    
  
 I have trouble changing my behaviour to suit different people and different situations.   
  
At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going. 
  
 I feel a bit awkward in public and do not show up quite as well as I should.   
  
I can look anyone in the eyes and tell a lie with a straight face. 
  
  















Opening call Closing call









Continuous follows call Continuous precedes call
Figure 2, Panel A: Frequency of call auction 



















































































































Toulouse, 1st sample LBS Toulouse, 2nd sample
1st miscalibration quartile 2nd miscalibration  quartile
3rd  miscalibration quartile 4rth  miscalibration quartile











1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4rth quartile
Average female earnings Average male earnings





























Toulouse, 1st sample LBS Toulouse, 2nd sample
1st quartile 2nd  quartile 3rd quartile 4rth  quartile
Figure 9: 
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Average female earnings Average male earnings
